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Self-enhancementIn this research we examine estimates of American social class mobility—the ability to move up or down in edu-
cation and income status. Across studies, overestimates of classmobilitywere large and particularly likely among
younger participants and those higher in subjective social class—both measured (Studies 1–3) and manipulated
(Study 4). Class mobility overestimates were independent of general estimation errors (Study 3) and persisted
after accounting for knowledge of classmobility assessed in terms of educational attainment and self-ratings. Ex-
periments revealed thatmobility overestimateswere shapedby exposure to information about the genetic deter-
minants of social class—a faux science article suggesting genetic constraints to economic advancement increased
accuracy in class mobility estimates (Study 2)—andmotivated by needs to protect the self—heightening the self-
relevance of class mobility increased overestimates (Study 3). Discussion focused on both the costs and beneﬁts
of overestimates of class mobility for individuals and society.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).“What I offer… is a set of concrete, practical proposals to speed up
growth, strengthen the middle class, and build new ladders of
opportunity into the middle class.”—President Barack Obama
(2014), State of the Union.
Economic inequality is among the most pressing societal problems
impacting the health and well-being of Americans: inequality reduces
well-being—Americans report elevated happiness in years where eco-
nomic inequality is lower compared to years when it is higher (Oishi,
Kesebir, & Diener, 2011). As well, roughly 70% of studies examining
the health impacts of economic inequality ﬁnd that societal health
worsens as economic inequality intensiﬁes (Wilkinson & Pickett,
2006).When economic inequality deepens, society suffers. These trends
are the likely reason why President Barack Obama made reducing eco-
nomic inequality through increasing social class mobility a primary
theme in his 2014 State of the Union Address.Whether or not economic
policy changes take hold is likely to depend on a number of factors,, University of Illinois, Urbana-
hampaign, IL 61820 USA.
. This is an open access article underamong them the extent that Americans recognize, and are aware of,
the levels of actual social class mobility in society. This research was de-
signed to examine potential inaccuracies in judgments of classmobility.
Across four studies, we compared estimates of American social class
mobility to actual available data. We hypothesized that Americans
would overestimate levels of income mobility and educational access
in the United States. We predicted further that these estimates would
be heightened by a lack of awareness of the factors that inﬂuence
economic opportunity in society, and motivated by a desire to protect
the self.
Class mobility, equality of opportunity, and the American Dream
The United States is faced with record levels of income inequality
and one of the lowest rates of actual social mobility among industrial
nations (Burkhauser, Feng, Jenkins, & Larrimore, 2009; Fiske &
Markus, 2012; Piketty & Saez, 2001). Despite these constraints on eco-
nomic opportunities, Americans place signiﬁcant hope on the
American Dream—the promise that individuals, from any sector of soci-
ety, have an equal opportunity to become better educated, earn more
money, and obtain whatever job they desire. These beliefs in social
class mobility are widespread, frequently referred to during politicalthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
102 M.W. Kraus, J.J.X. Tan / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 58 (2015) 101–111speeches (Obama, 2014), evoked in contemporary popular ﬁction and
cinema (Fitzgerald, 1925), and are a core right referred to in historical
government documents (i.e., the Bill of Rights).
The disconnect between actual economic conditions on the one
hand and beliefs in the American Dream on the other suggests that
Americans may be unaware of the actual levels of social class mobility
in society. Several lines of research anticipate this pattern of inaccuracy:
for instance, when a large sample of Americans was asked to guess
the levels of wealth inequality in the United States, individuals
underestimated the magnitude of economic inequality by a wide mar-
gin (Norton & Ariely, 2011). Americans also display low awareness of
how changes in economic conditions will impact their lives: when
asked to forecast how an economicwindfall will change their lives, indi-
viduals routinely overestimate the extent that these economic changes
will increase their happiness and well-being (e.g., Wilson & Gilbert,
2005). These data suggest that Americans are unaware of the actual
economic structure of society and of how changes in individual eco-
nomic conditions shape their own life outcomes, and provide the
starting point for our ﬁrst hypothesis: Americans will overestimate ac-
tual levels of social class mobility in society to a substantial degree (Hy-
pothesis I).
Informational and motivational aspects of class mobility beliefs
In general, individuals have many blind spots across diverse
domains of social life: people become surprisingly unaware of unique
objects (i.e., a dancing gorilla) if asked to focus on a separate visual
task (e.g., Simons & Jensen, 2009); individuals, primarily fromWestern
cultures, routinely ignore statistical probabilities and claim that they are
more moral, more intelligent, and less error-prone than others
(e.g., Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004); even memories for particularly
noteworthy events (e.g., the events of September 11th, 2001) are
fraught with inaccuracies that are driven by strong emotional
experiences (Hirst et al., 2009). Research indicates that errors in social
perception are driven by both informational factors—such as the lack
of awareness of statistical information relevant to actual mobility
trends—and motivational factors—the desire to believe that society is
meritocratic (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Here we examine both
sources of error in class mobility beliefs.
Inaccuracy in social class mobility arises, in part, because individuals
have a lack of information about actual class mobility in society beyond
their own personal anecdotes (for additional research on inaccuracy in
social class lay theories, see Varnum, 2013). Based on this logic, expo-
sure to information about the determinants of social class would likely
reduce overestimates of class mobility. In particular, we predict for our
second hypothesis, that calling attention to genetic factors that
inﬂuence economic advancementwill constrain beliefs in classmobility
(Hypothesis II).
We predict that genetic explanations for social class—explanations
suggesting that social class is determined by stable and internal genetic
factors (Kraus & Keltner, 2013)—are likely to reduce overestimates of
class mobility for two reasons: ﬁrst, genetic explanations highlight the
possibility that some individuals possess advantaged (inferior) genes
that enhance (reduce) the capacity to ascend the economic hierarchy.
Thus, genetic explanations provide a concrete reason for why class mo-
bility may not be possible for all Americans. Though research has not
tested relationships between genetic explanations and class mobility
speciﬁcally, genetic explanations of social groups have constrained
other beliefs related to social change: For example, increased race-
based essentialist beliefs (i.e., beliefs that racial categories are biological-
ly determined) were associated with decreased motivation to change
racial inequality in society (Williams & Eberhardt, 2008).
Second, genetic explanations are likely to be persuasive: a large and
consistent literature indicates that Americans tend to use internal ex-
planations (e.g., traits and genes) for social events and behaviors more
than external explanations (Jellison & Green, 1981; Morris & Peng,1994; Nisbett & Ross, 1980)—making genetic explanations particularly
like to shapemobility beliefs. Aswell, decades of gene research, primar-
ily conducted on twins, suggests that there are genetic components to
aspects of social class that include educational attainment and occupa-
tion status (e.g., Baker, Treloar, Reynolds, Heath, & Martin, 1996;
Rietveld et al., 2013; Tambs, Sundet, Magnus, & Berg, 1989)—thereby
affording genetic explanations for class mobility increased plausibility
in the minds of Americans. For these reasons, we expect that exposing
participants to genetic explanations of social class will reduce estimates
of class mobility, relative to exposure to non-genetic explanations.
In addition to informational errors, overestimates of social class mo-
bility are driven by motivated social cognition—that is, individuals en-
dorse speciﬁc personal or political attitudes because they satisfy basic
psychological needs (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).
Americans beneﬁt from overestimates of social class mobility because
they bolster widely held American ideals of meritocracy and equality
of opportunity (Durkheim, 1933; Fiske & Markus, 2012; Weber, 1930).
Thus, overestimates of class mobility satisfy the need to believe that
the societal status of the self and others is determined fairly and justly.
Classmobility overestimatesmay also increase the tendency for individ-
uals to work harder and strive for economic advancement—even when
they are currently lower in the social hierarchy. In this fashion, overes-
timates of class mobility can be both beneﬁcial and adaptive for one's
life outcomes (c.f., Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012; Johnson,
Blumstein, Fowler, & Haselton, 2013).
Our motivated perspective suggests that class mobility overesti-
mates are likely driven, at least in part, by motivations to protect the
self—especially with regard to economic outcomes. Speciﬁcally, we pre-
dict, for our third hypothesis, thatmotivations to see the self positively—
including with respect to the possibility for future economic advance-
ment and opportunity—will enhance overestimates of class mobility
(Hypothesis III).
Research on self-enhancement provides indirect empirical support
for our third hypothesis: in achievement domains, where people are
concerned about the evaluations of others, individuals are likely to
engage in self-protection by seeing the self more positively, as well as
to seek out enhancing appraisals from others (James, 1890; Sedikides
& Gregg, 2008). Research on the better-than-average effect—wherein
individuals consistently evaluate their traits and behaviors as above av-
erage (Alicke, 1985; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Festinger,
1954)—has a rich tradition in social psychology, and alignswith our pre-
diction that concerns to protect the self will increase overestimates of
class mobility.
Social class and estimates of class mobility
Ourmotivated perspective on classmobility also suggests a relation-
ship between position in the class hierarchy and overestimates of class
mobility: with respect to this relationship, research is divided on
whether people at the top or bottom of the class hierarchy will be
more likely to overestimate class mobility (see Brandt, 2013). It is
possible that relatively lower-class individuals will overestimate class
mobility more than their upper-class counterparts, because beliefs in
mobility may enhance optimism about future economic success and se-
lect research supports this perspective (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004):
for instance, recent evidence suggests that relatively lower-class indi-
viduals are more likely to engage in behaviors that actually promote
economic mobility—Democratic members of the US Congress were
more likely to sponsor legislation that decreases economic inequality
in society (e.g., raising the minimum wage) if they were lower (versus
higher) in average annual wealth (Kraus & Callaghan, 2014). Practically,
higher levels of educational attainment might provide individuals with
more exposure to information about actual social class mobility, and
increase accuracy by implication, relative to lower levels.
In contrast, evidence and theory also converge on the opposite
relationship between social class position and overestimates of class
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tion in society is both fairly achieved and possible for all Americans will
lead individuals from relatively upper-class backgrounds tomake larger
overestimates of social class mobility. Several lines of research support
this perspective: for instance, people with higher status are happier
when they believe that positive outcomes in society are based on
merit (Napier & Jost, 2008; O'Brien & Major, 2005) and high-
performingmembers of a group aremore likely to advocate dividing re-
sources based solely onmerit (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg, Kay, & Payne,
2015; Messick & Sentis, 1979). As well, individuals who ranked them-
selves more highly in subjective social class reported a greater belief
that the world is both meritocratic and that economic outcomes are
fair than did their lower-class counterparts (Kraus & Keltner, 2013).
Taken together, though these lines of evidence suggest that mobility
estimates will be motivated by one's position in the class hierarchy, the
directionality of the relationship remains unclear. In the present re-
search, we use correlational (Studies 1 and 3) and experimental
(Study 4) approaches to explore and estimate the precise direction
and strength of the relationship between measures of social class and
estimates of class mobility. Moreover, it is possible that distinct compo-
nents of social class will be differentially related to overestimates of
class mobility (Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner,
2012)—with education being negatively related given its relationship
to information exposure, and subjective rank perceptions of social
class being positively related, given associations withmeritocracy judg-
ments in prior research (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2015). Because of these
conditions, throughout the studies we separately examine relationships
between unique facets of social class and class mobility beliefs.
The present research
We used four studies, one correlational and three experimental, to
test three hypotheses related to estimates of social class mobility, and
to assess the relationship between perceptions of such mobility and
various individual differences. In Study 1, we measured beliefs about
class mobility using an online sample of adults from the United States
and compared these estimates to statistics on actual class mobility
generated from analyses of the Current Population Survey (www.
stateofworkingamerica.org; Mishel, Bivens, Gould, & Shierholz, 2012).
In Studies 2 through 4, participants were exposed to experimental ma-
nipulations of genetic beliefs about social class (Study 2), the self-
relevance of mobility estimates (Study 3), and subjective social class
(Study 4). Throughout the studies we examined associations between
estimates of class mobility and individual differences related to age
and social class, while accounting for knowledge of economic mobility
assessed by educational attainment (Studies 1–4) and self-reports of
mobility knowledge (Study 3), general errors in estimation (Study 3),
and individual differences related to trait optimism and political
conservatism.
The present research advances our understanding of estimates of
social class mobility in two primary ways: though social scientists and
economists have long claimed that Americans believe in equality of op-
portunity (e.g., Benabou & Ok, 2001), this research is among the ﬁrst, to
examine the magnitude of overestimates of class mobility in relation-
ship to real data on actual mobility and to determine the psychological
causes of these overestimates. It is important to estimate themagnitude
of overestimates of class mobility because large overestimates may ren-
der mobility concerns less likely to inﬂuence the agendas of policy-
makers (e.g., Schwartz, 2011). Although recent research has examined
meritocracy judgments (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2015), genetic explana-
tions for social class (Kraus & Keltner, 2013), and estimates of economic
mobility (see Davidai & Gilovich, 2015), this work is also the ﬁrst to de-
termine, in particular, the causal factors that inﬂuence inaccuracies in
estimates of class mobility. Given the hypothesizedwide disconnect be-
tween beliefs inmobility and actualmobility (c.f., Charles &Hurst, 2003;
Keister, 2005), understanding the causal psychological processes thatbias class mobility estimates has the potential to inform interventions
that decrease barriers to economic advancement.Study 1: mobility beliefs in an online sample of Americans
Study 1, compares estimates of social class mobility to available data
using a large sample of online participants. We expected overestimates
of class mobility to be large, and to be inﬂuenced by a lack of available
information and by motivations to protect the self. A secondary focus
of Study 1was to assess the associations between individual differences
in social class, age, political ideology, and optimism, and their unique
associations with estimates of class mobility.
With respect to individual differences, our dual account of mobility
beliefs suggests that younger individuals might be particularly likely
to overestimate class mobility relative to their older counterparts. In
terms of information, younger individuals' relative lack of life experi-
ence may make them less aware of barriers to class mobility. In terms
of motivation, younger individuals may also be motivated to believe in
enhanced class mobility and economic opportunity early on in adult-
hood where opportunities for advancement (e.g., education and train-
ing) are more readily available (e.g., Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, &
Fahey, 1998). Together, this logic suggests the prediction that younger
participants will provide larger overestimates of social class mobility.
We also expected social class to relate to class mobility, although we
did not make speciﬁc predictions about the directionality of this
relationship.Method
Participants
We collected a large online sample of participants (n = 751) from
Mechanical Turk to complete our mobility beliefs survey. The partici-
pants were 18 years of age or older (M = 31.47, SD = 11.20) and
were all American citizens. Participants were paid $1.00 for participat-
ing in the survey, whichwas described as an assessment of people's per-
sonality and beliefs about society, and were debriefed about the
hypotheses of the study upon completion. The survey took the partici-
pants less than 10 min to complete. All participants surveyed were in-
cluded in the analyses except in speciﬁc cases where they had missing
data.Measures
Mobility beliefs
We created six questions to assess the participants' beliefs in social
class mobility. For each of these items, population data exist from the
years 1996–2007 on actual social class mobility in the United States
(www.stateofworkingamerica.org; Mishel et al., 2012). Three of the
items assessed beliefs in income mobility: participants were asked to
think about 100 people during a ten-year time period from 1997–
2006. The questions asked participants to assess how many of these
100 peoplewould (1)move from the bottom 20% of income byworking
1000 extra hours (M= 36.08, SD= 25.24); (2) move from the bottom
20% of income to the top 20%? (M=15.60, SD=17.88); and (3) move
from the top 1% of income to the bottom 80%? (M=14.57, SD=17.88).
Three educationalmobility questions assessed (4) howmany of a group
of 100 people would move from the bottom 20% of income with some
kind of college degree? (M = 61.34, SD = 22.52), (5) how many of
100 top college and university studentswould be from the top 20%of in-
come families? (M = 43.54, SD = 20.62); and (6) how many of these
100 students would be from the bottom 20% of income families?
(M= 15.83, SD= 11.65).
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Based on recommendations from prior research (Kraus &
Stephens, 2012; Kraus et al., 2012), we assessed social class using
four indices: annual income, educational attainment, occupation
status, and subjective social class. Annual income was assessed
using seven categories: (1) b$15,000; (2) $15,001–$30,000;
(3) $30,001–$45,000; (4) $45,001–$75,000; (5) $75,001–$100,000;
(6) $100,001–$150,000; and (7) N$150,000 (M = 3.44, SD = 1.62).
The median income of the sample was between $30,001 and
$45,000—a ﬁgure consistent with US Census data on national median
income levels (census.gov). Educational attainment was assessed
using three categories: (1) high school graduation; (2) college grad-
uation; (3) post-graduate degree (M= 1.73, SD=0.67). Occupation
status was assessed using three categories: (1) unemployed;
(2) part-time employee; and (3) full-time employee, (M = 2.12,
SD = 0.87). To assess subjective social class rank (M = 5.00, SD =
1.77), we presented participants with a picture of a ten rung ladder
representing ascending levels of income, education, and occupation
status in society (e.g., Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000;
Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009).Political orientation
Two items were used to assess political orientation. Participants
responded to items assessing the extent they identiﬁed as socially
or economically liberal (conservative) using 7-point Likert scales
(1 = very conservative, 7 = very liberal). These two items were
averaged, given their high correlation (r= .58), for an overall index of
political orientation (M= 4.67, SD= 1.50).Trait optimism
Participants ﬁlled out an eight item measure of optimism based on
prior research (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). A sample item is “In uncer-
tain times I usually expect the best.” Participants used 7-point Likert
scales to enter their responses (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree;M= 3.34, SD= 0.81; α= .90).0
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Fig. 1. Participant estimates of social class mobility on each of the six items (dark gray bars)
conﬁdence intervals around the estimate.Results
Overall estimates of class mobility beliefs
We ﬁrst examined speciﬁc social class mobility beliefs for each of the
six items. See Fig. 1 for comparisons between estimates and actual
population data on social class mobility. As shown in the ﬁgure, partici-
pants overestimated the extent that Americans can move up or down
the social class hierarchy. In terms of upward mobility, participants
overestimated, over a ten year period, the extent that working 1000
extra hourswould improve their income standing, the number of individ-
uals whowouldmove from the bottom 20% to the top 20% of income, the
amount that some college would move people out of the bottom 20% of
income, and the number of students from the bottom20% of income fam-
ilies at top universities. Participants also underestimated the extent that
students from the top universities are from the top 20% of income fami-
lies, suggesting again that participants overestimated the extent that uni-
versities are open to Americans from lower income levels. For downward
mobility beliefs about moving out of the top 20% in income, participant
estimates were consistent with actual population data. These results are
consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis—participants overestimated the
extent that people actually move up in wealth, and the extent that col-
leges and universities are open to people from lower income families.
To examine the extent that participants in our sample gave an overall
overestimation of social class mobility across the six items, we calculated
the difference between the actual social class mobility and the estimate
for each participant. For this calculation, higher numbers indicate elevat-
ed beliefs in classmobility up or down the hierarchy.We then tested this
number against zero, which would indicate accuracy in estimates of so-
cial class mobility. Consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis, we found that
participants were likely to overestimate the extent that social class mo-
bility exists in America (M= 18.76, CI 95% [17.98 to 19.55], d= 3.64).
Individual differences related to social class mobility beliefs
We tested associations with age and social class ﬁrst by examining
correlations between overall mobility overestimates and individualbility
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compared to population data (light gray bars) on actual mobility. Brackets indicate 95%
Table 1
Correlations between social class mobility estimates, social class, age, optimism, and political orientation (Study 1). Asterisks “*” indicate that p b .05.
Mobility (over) estimate Subjective social class Age Education Income Occupation Optimism
Mobility (over) estimate –
Subjective social class .08* –
Age − .15* − .03 –
Education − .10* .24* .16* –
Income .01 .53* − .01 .20* –
Occupation − .08* .23* .07 .23* .27* –
Optimism .05 .28* .09 .10* .12* .12* –
Political Orientation − .18* − .04 − .15* − .01 − .06 − .01 − .11*
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analysis are displayed in Table 1. Consistent with our expectations, youn-
ger people tended to overestimate social class mobility more than older
participants. Youth was also associated with educational attainment,
higher scores on optimism, and more liberal political ideology.
For social class we found a mixed pattern of results: educational at-
tainment and occupation status both showed small negative associa-
tions with overestimates of social class mobility, whereas subjective
social class rank showed a small signiﬁcant positive association with
mobility overestimates. Incomewas not reliably associated with mobil-
ity overestimates. Conservatives tended to show a moderate tendency
to overestimate social class mobility relative to more liberal partici-
pants. Trait optimism did not exhibit a reliable positive association
with social class mobility estimates. All measures of social class showed
small to moderate associations with trait optimism and no signiﬁcant
associations with political ideology.
Because age and several of the social class variableswere correlated in
the above analysis, and because relationships between different indices
of social class were inconsistently associated with mobility overesti-
mates, we used a regression framework to determine the unique rela-
tionships between these variables and class mobility beliefs. The linear
regression analysis used overall mobility estimates as the outcome vari-
able, and age, income, occupation status, education, subjective social
class rank, optimism, and political orientation as predictor variables.
The analysis yielded a negative association between age andmobility be-
liefs—being younger β=− .14, t(620)=−3.43, p b .01 predicted larger
overestimates of social class mobility. Subjective social class perceptions
were positively associated with mobility overestimates, with higher so-
cial class rank associated with greater overestimates of class mobility
β = .12, t(620) = 2.56, p = .01. Optimism β = .06, t(620) = 1.49,
p= .14, income β=− .05, t(620)=−1.07, p= .28, educational attain-
ment β = − .08, t(620) = −1.86, p = .06, and occupation status
β=− .07, t(620)=−1.75, p=.08were unrelated tomobility estimates
in the regression analysis. Finally, conservatives β = − .14,
t(620) =−3.43, p b .01 provided larger overestimates of class mobility
than did liberals. Although the effects were small in comparison to the
magnitude of overall class mobility overestimates, this regression analy-
sis indicates that age and subjective social class perceptions uniquely pre-
dict mobility beliefs independent of educational attainment—an indirect
assessment of exposure to knowledge on class mobility—as well as opti-
mistic views of the future and political ideology.1Discussion
Study 1 provides correlational evidence in support of our ﬁrst hy-
pothesis and clariﬁes our predictions regarding relationships between
social class andmobility estimates. Consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis,
Americans tend to overestimate the extent that people can move1 In an exploratory analysis we examined interactions between age and subjective so-
cial class rank on estimates of class mobility using a linear regression analysis also includ-
ing main effects of age and subjective social class. While age β= − .15, t(715) = −3.90,
p b .01 and subjective social class β= .07, t(715) = 2.00, p b .05 were related to mobility
estimates as in the prior analyses, the interaction was not, t(715) = 0.27, ns.up (or down) the social class hierarchy: participants in our sample
thought that people move up in income more often than they actually
do, do so more easily through extra work hours and education, and
overestimated the extent that higher education is accessible to lower in-
come families. On average, these mobility estimates exceeded actual
class mobility by nearly 19 percentage points across the indices.
We also found support for an age association with class mobility be-
liefs: speciﬁcally, younger individuals were more likely to overestimate
social classmobility relative to their older counterparts—this pattern like-
ly emerged because young people have less experience with class mobil-
ity, as well as more motivation to believe in the possibility of future
economic opportunity. As well, evidence from Study 1 suggests that
higher subjective perceptions of social class are related to overestimates
of class mobility. We interpret this pattern of results to suggest that per-
ceptions of elevated position in the class hierarchy motivate beliefs that
class mobility is fair, just, and possible for many average Americans. In
contrast, peoplewith higher educational attainment tend to be better in-
formed (through their education) about economic mobility in America.
Importantly, the associations with age and perceived social class held in-
dependently of measures of political ideology and trait optimism.
Study 2: genetic explanations and class mobility beliefs
The results of Study 1 are consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis regard-
ing overestimates of social class mobility, but the correlational design
leaves open the possibility that unaccounted for third variables unrelated
to informational andmotivational accounts of class mobility explain pat-
terns of mobility beliefs. In the remaining studies we turn to experimen-
tal designs to demonstrate causal shifts in overestimates of classmobility.
To wit, Study 2 exposes participants to a faux science news article sug-
gesting either that scientists had discovered the genetic basis for social
class, or a lack of genetic inﬂuence on social class (i.e., Kraus & Keltner,
2013; Tan&Kraus, 2015).We expected that learning about the genetic
basis of social class—because it exposes participants to a plausible in-
ﬂuence on individual economic opportunity, related to genetic po-
tential—would reduce overestimates of class mobility relative to
learning about social class as not inﬂuenced by genes.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 345 undergraduate students enrolled in psy-
chology courses at a major public university in the Midwestern
United States. The total sample size was reached by planning to col-
lect data for this study across two full semesters at the university
(Spring 2013 and Fall 2013). The majority of participants were fe-
male (n = 217). The largest ethnic group was European American
(n=113), followed by Other (n=87), Asian American (n=82), La-
tino/a (n = 43), African American (n = 29), and Native American
(n = 2). Participants were permitted to enter more than one ethnic
category. Mean age in the sample was 19.42 (SD = 1.42). All partic-
ipants surveyed were included in analyses except in speciﬁc cases
where they had missing data.
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Participants accessed the survey through computer terminals which
directed them ﬁrst to read a consent document for a study designed to
measure relationships between personality characteristics and atti-
tudes about society. Following consent, the ﬁrst part of the study
assessed participants' memory for and retention ofmaterial in scientiﬁc
articles. Within this scientiﬁc article memory exercise was our ge-
netic beliefs about social class manipulation (Kraus & Keltner,
2013). In the second part of the study, participants answered ques-
tions about their health and emotions (reported in Tan & Kraus, in
press). In the third part of the study, participants answered ques-
tions about their beliefs regarding social class mobility in society
and answered demographic questionnaires. Following these demo-
graphic questionnaires participants were probed for suspicion and
debriefed regarding the hypotheses of the study. None (n = 0) of
the participants were able to successfully guess the hypotheses of
the study when they were probed for suspicion.
Manipulation of essentialist beliefs
Our manipulation of essentialist beliefs was identical to that of previ-
ous research (see, Kraus & Keltner, 2013). We had participants read two
mock scientiﬁc news articles—the ﬁrst was a ﬁller article about will
power in eating and dieting. The second article was one of two possible
scientiﬁc articles about the (non)-genetic basis of social class. In the article
advancing the argument for the genetic basis of social class, researchers
were said to have discovered the speciﬁc genes underlying a person's so-
cial class, that lower-class individuals had more similarity in genes with
other lower-class individuals, and that these genes were inherited from
their parents. In the article advocating the non-genetic basis for social
class, the same researchers suggested that there was no evidence linking
speciﬁc genes to an individual's social class, that lower-class individuals
had no special genetic similarity to other lower-class individuals, and
that social class was not inherited from one's parents. To determine the
success of the manipulation, we asked attention check questions for re-
tention of article information for both mock science articles. For the
ﬁrst article on will power, we asked participants whether the article
was consistent with the statement: “Having sweets readily available
should decrease your desire of them.” For the (non)-genetic basis of
social class articles, we asked participants if the article argument was
consistent with the statements: “Social class is stable, inherent, and
biologically determined.” and “There is no genetic basis to social
class.” Participants responded to these questions on 7-point Likert
scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).
Social class mobility
Participants answered the same six questions related to social class
mobility as in Study 1. As in Study 1, we calculated an overall estimate
of social class mobility such that higher scores indicated greater overes-
timates of mobility up or down (M= 26.34, SD= 10.76).
Objective and subjective social class
Participants ﬁlled out measures of income, educational attainment,
and subjective social class in Study 2. Because participants were college
students, and presumably, not yet fully identiﬁed with a particular so-
cial class, the income (M=5.11, SD=1.98) and educational attainment
of participants' family (Mmother = 1.91, SDmother = 0.70;Mfather = 2.07,
SDfather = 0.79) was assessed using the same categories as in Study 1.
The median income of the University sample was between $75,001
and $100,000, higher than the National median, but consistent with
prior University student data (e.g., Kraus & Keltner, 2009). We assessed
family subjective social class rank using the same ladder measure as inStudy 1 (M = 6.71, SD = 1.63). Political ideology was assessed as in
the prior study.
Results
Overall estimates of class mobility
We ﬁrst examined the overall estimates of social class mobility col-
lapsed across the manipulation of genetic beliefs about social class.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis, that Americans would overestimate social class
mobility was supported in these data: participants substantially
overestimated social class mobility in society (M = 26.33, CI 95%
[25.19, 27.48], d= 4.90).
Manipulation check
Wenext examined the success of our genetic basis of social classma-
nipulation. We examined response means of the genetic and non-
genetic conditions for the three memory items. As expected, the genes
group (M= 4.86) thought that social class was more “stable, inherent,
and biologically determined” than the no genes group (M = 1.90),
t(340) =−2.96, p b .01. The no genes group (M= 5.66) agreed with
the statement that social class had “no genetic basis” more than the
genes group (M = 2.51), t(340) = 3.15, p b .01. Both the genes (M =
5.19) and the no genes (M= 5.40) groups agreed with the will power
question to a similar degree t(340)= 1.11, p= .27. Overall, these anal-
yses suggest that our manipulation was successful in delivering unique
information about the genetic basis of social class.
Genetic explanations and class mobility
For our second hypothesis, we predicted that exposure to genetic ex-
planations about social classwould decrease estimates of social classmo-
bility relative to exposure to beliefs that social class has no genetic basis.
To test this hypothesis,we examinedmean-level differences between the
genes and no genes groups on our six social class mobility items. For four
of the six class mobility items, the genetic group reduced overestimates
of social class mobility beliefs relative to the non-genetic group.
Speciﬁcally, compared to the non-genetic group, participants in the
genetic group (MGenetic = 17.21;MNon-Genetic = 25.59) gave more accu-
rate estimates of the number of people who would move to the top
ﬁfth of income earners (CI 95% difference [4.32, 12.42]), move down
from the top 20% of income earners (MGenetic = 19.65; MNon-Genetic =
25.37; CI 95% difference [0.96, 10.49]), and of the number of students
from the bottom 20% of income families at top colleges and universities
(MGenetic=14.96;MNon-Genetic=18.10;CI95%difference [1.12, 5.16]). As
well, the genetic group (MGenetic=40.86;MNon-Genetic=35.58) was less
likely to underestimate the number of students from the top 20% of in-
come families at major colleges and universities in comparison to the
non-genetic group (CI 95% difference [−1.19, −9.38]). Estimates of
how many people would improve their income status by conducting
extra work (CI 95% difference [−3.58, 7.78]) or by earning a college de-
gree (CI 95% difference [−0.02, 8.31]) did not show a reliable difference
between the two experimental groups.
An examination of overall overestimates of social class mobility
across the six items assessing mobility beliefs reveals a similar pattern
(see the second and third bars from the left in Fig. 2). Participants in
the genetic and non-genetic groups both overestimate social class mo-
bility, but consistent with Hypothesis II, participants in the genetic
group gave less biased estimates of social class mobility than did
those in the non-genetic group t(343) = 4.61, p b .01, d = 0.50.
Individual differences in age (r=− .09, p= .11), parental education
(rmom=− .04, p=.44; rdad=− .08, p=.15), income (r=.08, p=.15),
subjective perceptions of social class (r=.04, p=.48), and political ide-
ology (r=− .07, p= .21) were unrelated to estimates of class mobility
in Study 2—although the direction of these effects was consistent with
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Fig. 2. Overall estimates of social class mobility from each of the four studies. Error bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals around the mean.
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icantly constrained the range of these variables relative to the online par-
ticipants in Study 1 (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). It is also
possible that Study 2 lacked sufﬁcient power to observe the small rela-
tionships between age, subjective social class, andmobility overesti-
mates found in Study 1. Despite these limitations and consistent
with Study 1 (see Fig. 2, three leftmost bars), the younger Study 2
participants (Mage = 19.42) provided larger overestimates of class
mobility than their older Study 1 counterparts (Mage = 31.47).
Discussion
The results from Study 2 provide additional evidence in support of
our central hypotheses. Consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis, university
students overestimated social class mobility beliefs to a large degree.
We also found support for our second hypothesis: exposure to genetic
explanations of social class reduced the overestimates of social class
mobility relative to non-genetic explanations. Importantly, our younger
university student sample provided overestimates of class mobility that
were higher than that of our older online adult participants in Study 1—
a result consistent with the age ﬁndings in Study 1. Finally, associations
betweenmeasures of social class and overestimates of classmobility did
not emerge in Study 2, but this lack of association could have been a by-
product of the combination of the small effect size of the associations
between social class and mobility overestimates or the truncated
range of social class at four-year universities (Stephens, Markus, &
Fryberg, 2012). We continue to track associations between social class
and class mobility beliefs in the studies that follow.
Study 3: the self-relevance of class mobility beliefs
Study 3 sought to test our motivated account of class mobility by
varying the extent that estimates of class mobility were relevant to
the self. Participants in the study were asked to make class mobility es-
timates in general and for individuals similar to the self in goals,motiva-
tion, and abilities. We predicted that increasing the self-relevance of
mobility estimates in this fashion would engage enhanced motivated
reasoning, and by implication, increase overestimates of class mobility.
As in the prior studies, we again assessed associations between class
mobility estimates and age and social class. As in the ﬁrst two studies,
we assessed political ideology to determine if class mobility estimates
would vary independently of liberal or conservative political beliefs.Importantly, Studies 1 and 2 have relied on a six item mobility belief
measure that asks participants to make an abstract estimate of the extent
that social class mobility exists in American society. It is possible that the
overestimateswe have observed in the ﬁrst two studies are simply due to
general errors in perception and estimation of complex statistical proba-
bilities and not class mobility in particular. In Study 3 we account for
this alternative explanation by having participants make estimates for
abstract statistical information that is unrelated to class mobility. We ex-
pected participants to make overestimates of class mobility independent
of these non-mobility relevant statistical estimates.
Method
Participants
As in Study 1, we collected a large online sample of the participants
(n=747) fromMechanical Turk to complete ourmobility beliefs survey.
Participants were 18 years of age or older (M= 33.92, SD= 10.65) and
were all American citizens. Participants were paid $1.00 for participating
in the survey, which was described as an assessment of people's person-
ality and beliefs about society, and were debriefed about the hypothe-
ses of the study upon completion. The survey took participants
less than 10 min to complete. All participants surveyed were in-
cluded in analyses except in speciﬁc cases where they had missing
data or if they had previously taken part in Study 1.
Self-relevance manipulation and measures
Participants completed an identical survey to that of Study 1, only in
Study 3 the participants ﬁlled out two versions of the six-item mobility
beliefs measure in a counterbalanced order—ordering did not change
our results. The ﬁrst version was identical to the wording of Study
1and reﬂected a general estimate of class mobility beliefs. The second
version heightened the self-relevance of class mobility estimates by
asking the participants to estimate mobility for individuals who “are
similar to you in termsof goals, abilities, talents, andmotivations. ”Over-
estimates of class mobility from the general (M= 19.41, SD= 12.73)
and self-relevant (M=24.53, SD=14.67) versions of the six-itemmobil-
ity beliefsmeasurewere calculated as in the prior studies. Measures of in-
come (M=3.69, SD=1.56; themedianwas again between $30,001 and
$45,000), educational attainment (M=1.74, SD=0.63), subjective so-
cial class (M=5.00, SD=1.70), and political ideology (M=4.67, SD=
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added a subjective assessment of how much participants know about
economic mobility in America using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not
at all, 6 = a great deal; M = 4.04, SD = 1.14). This latter measure
was used to assess the extent that knowledge about class mobility
predicts participant estimates.
To gauge participant tendencies to overestimate statistical informa-
tion unrelated to class mobility, we assessed participant responses to
three questions related to soccer and astronauts—two domains we ex-
pected participants to have little information to make precise judg-
ments. These questions were chosen based on pilot testing, which
revealed that Americans were generally uniformed about the members
of the US men's soccer team and of the demographic characteristics of
astronauts. Participants answered one American soccer question: spe-
ciﬁcally, participants were asked, based on the 2014 roster of the
men's US World Cup soccer team, to guess how many of a sample of
100 team members would have been born outside of the United
States? (M= 38.99, SD= 27.10; www.espn.com). With respect to as-
tronauts, participants were asked, of a sample of 100 US astronauts,
(1) how many would be military personnel? (M= 58.98, SD= 26.99;
www.nasa.gov) and (2) how many would be women? (M = 18.61,
SD = 13.91; www.nasa.gov). On average, participants were accu-
rate about the number of astronauts who are military personnel
(60.9%) and overestimated the extent that US soccer players were
born outside of the US (17.4%) and the extent that astronauts are
women (14.5%). As with the class mobility estimates, overestima-
tion for these questions was computed and then averaged to indi-
cate an overall metric of general estimation (M=7.82, SD=14.32).
Results
As expected, and consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis, both general
estimates t(746) = 41.68, p b .01, d= 3.05 and self-relevant estimates
t(746) = 45.70, p b .01, d= 3.35 signiﬁcantly overestimated the levels
of class mobility. In particular, we expected overestimates of class mo-
bility to be larger when framed as relevant to the self. To test this hy-
pothesis we conducted a paired samples t-test comparing means for
general and self-relevant estimates of class mobility. The results of this
analysis align with our third hypothesis: participants provided larger
overestimates of class mobility when the mobility judgments were
framed as relevant to the self (M = 24.53) in comparison to when
they were not (M= 19.41), t(746) =−15.84, p b .01, d= 0.58.
Our motivated account of class mobility estimates suggests that
overestimates of class mobility are beyond simple errors in statistical
probability calculation. To more directly test this prediction, we exam-
ined mobility estimates in comparison to estimates for our non-
mobility statistics related to soccer players and astronauts. For this anal-
ysis, we conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with non-mobility estimates, general class mobility estimates, and
self-relevant class mobility estimates as three levels of a single factor.
The overall analysis was signiﬁcant F(2,1456)= 275.38, p b .01, and re-
vealed signiﬁcant differences between all three groups that alignedwith
our predictions (see Fig. 2, three light gray bars). Speciﬁcally, thoughTable 2
Correlations between general (below the diagonal) and self-relevant (above the diagonal) socia
entation (Study 3). Asterisks “*” indicate that p b .05.
Mobility (over) estimate Subjective social class
Mobility (over) estimate – .27*
Subjective social class .20* –
Age − .12* − .03
Education − .05* .28*
Income .17* .58*
Knowledge − .09* .05
Political ideology − .19* − .17*participants overestimated non-mobility statistics (M = 7.82) they
were more likely to overestimate social class mobility (M = 19.26),
and in particular, when these estimates were described as relevant to
the self (M= 24.30).
We next tested associations between age, social class measures, and
class mobility estimates. See Table 2 for correlational analyses examining
associations with general (below the diagonal) and self-relevant (above
the diagonal) estimates of class mobility. Correlations reveal similar pat-
terns as observed in Study 1. For general class mobility estimates, age
was signiﬁcantly negatively associated with greater overestimates of
class mobility. As in Study 1, higher subjective perceptions of social class
rankwere signiﬁcantly associatedwith overestimates ofmobility. Income
was also positively associatedwith classmobility estimates in this sample
whereas educational attainment was not associated. Once again, conser-
vatives provided larger overestimates of class mobility. In addition, re-
duced self-rated knowledge of economic mobility predicted increased
overestimates of class mobility—providingmore support for the informa-
tional component to class mobility overestimates. The same patterns
emerged for the self-relevant mobility estimates, only with these esti-
mates, self-rated knowledge was not related to mobility estimates.
When we used the linear regression framework, as in Study 1,
predicting class mobility overestimates with age, social class measures,
political ideology and self-rated knowledge, a similar pattern emerged:
in the full model accounting for self-rated knowledge β = − .06,
t(693) = −1.53, p = .13 and political ideology β = − .16,
t(693) = −4.34, p b .01, age negatively predicted mobility overesti-
mates β= − .12, t(693) = −3.14, p b .01 and subjective social class
positively predicted mobility overestimates β = .14, t(693) = 3.06,
p b .01. This latter ﬁnding indicates that age and subjective social class
predict mobility overestimates independent of political ideology and
self-rated knowledge of economicmobility. Incomewas positively asso-
ciated with the overestimates of class mobility in this model β= .09,
t(693) = 2.04, p b .05 whereas educational attainment was not associ-
ated with the mobility estimates β=− .07, t(693) =−1.69, p= .09.
Discussion
Study 3 provided additional support for each of our hypotheses: par-
ticipants again provided substantial overestimates of class mobility, and
even did so in Study 3 relative to statistical estimates unrelated to mo-
bility beliefs. Importantly and consistent with our third hypothesis,
heightening the self-relevance of the mobility estimates increased the
tendency for the participants to overestimate class mobility—this latter
ﬁnding is consistent with our motivated account of mobility estimates.
Age and social class were associated with overestimates of class mo-
bility in line with Study 1: younger and higher subjective social class
participants overestimated class mobility. Importantly, relationships
between age, subjective social class, and overestimates of social class
mobility held even after accounting for political ideology, educational
attainment, and self-reports of knowledge about economic mobility—a
result suggesting that overestimates of class mobility relate to age and
social class in ways that are independent of both explicit knowledge of
economic mobility and political beliefs.l class mobility estimates, social class, age, self-ratedmobility knowledge, and political ori-
Age Education Income Knowledge Political ideology
− .14* − .01 .21* − .05 − .23*
–
.11* –
− .03 .25* –
.08* .15* .09* –
− .09* .04 − .12* .07 –
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Up to this point our ﬁndings across the previous studies indicate that
higher subjective ratings of social class predict greater overestimates of
class mobility: in essence, those who see themselves at the top of
society's hierarchy aremotivated to overestimate classmobility because
such overestimates suggest that class mobility is possible for everyone
and that elevated positions in society are achieved fairly by individuals.
Study 4 sought to demonstrate this pattern of results using an experi-
mental design wherein subjective social class is manipulated, rather
than measured (e.g., Emery & Le, 2014; Kraus, Horberg, Goetz, &
Keltner, 2011). By manipulating subjective social class, we can rule out
alternative explanations for the relationship between perceptions of so-
cial class and estimates of class mobility (e.g., differences in peer group
references, experiences of real upwardmobility, self-esteem). In Study4
we momentarily manipulated subjective social class rank and then
assessed mobility beliefs as in the prior studies. We expected that ma-
nipulated higher subjective social class would lead to greater overesti-
mates of social class mobility relative to lower subjective social class.
Method
Participants
As in Study 1, we collected a large online sample of participants
(n= 420) from Mechanical Turk to complete our mobility beliefs sur-
vey. We set a goal of collecting at least a sample of 400 participants be-
cause our prior studies showed a range of associations between
subjective social class perceptions and mobility overestimates (r= .04
to .27), and 400 participants provide more than 80% power to observe
an association of r = 15. Participants were 18 years of age or older
(M = 34.07, SD = 11.63) and were all American citizens. Participants
were paid $1.00 for participating in the survey, which was described
as an assessment of people's personality and beliefs about society, and
were debriefed about the hypotheses of the study upon completion.
The survey took participants less than 10 min to complete. All partici-
pants surveyed were included in analyses except in speciﬁc cases
where they had missing data and in cases where participants had
taken part in Study 1 or Study 3.
Procedure
Participants accessed the survey online and ﬁlled out demographic
information about themselves, including measures of objective social
class. Following these survey measures, participants' social class rank
was manipulated in a procedure adapted from prior research
(e.g., Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010). In this manipulation, participants
were presented with a ladder with 10 rungs and were instructed to
“think of the ladder above as representing where people stand in the
United States” (see Adler et al., 2000). Participants were then assigned
to either a low or high social class rank position, based on the following
instructions: “Now, please compare yourself to the people at the very
bottom (top) of the ladder. These are people who are the worst (best)
off—those who have the least (most) money, least (most) education,
and the least (most) respected jobs. In particular, we'd like you to
think about how you are different from these people in terms of your
own income, educational history, and job status. Where would you
place yourself on this ladder relative to these people at the very bottom
(top)?”
Participants were then instructed to place themselves on the
ladder relative to the person at the very top or bottom (1 = bottom
rung, 10 = top rung;M=5.00, SD=1.70). To heighten the salience
of the manipulated social class rank of the imagined interaction
partner, participants then imagined themselves “in a getting
acquainted interaction with one of the people you just thought
about from the ladder above.” In particular, participants wereinstructed to “think about how the differences between you
might impact what you would talk about, how the interaction is
likely to go, and what you and the other person might say to each
other.”
Following this procedure, participants ﬁlled out the self-relevant
class mobility estimates from Study 3. We chose to have participants
ﬁll out this self-relevant measure rather than the general mobility
estimates because of the stronger observed correlation in Study 3 with
measured subjective social class.
Results
Social class rank and class mobility beliefs
In support of our ﬁrst hypothesis, participants once again made sub-
stantial overestimates of self-relevant class mobility (M=29.38) when
compared to a total accuracy score (i.e., “0”), t(419) = 48.61, p b .01,
d=4.75. In addition, participants overestimated classmobility even rel-
ative to the non-mobility estimates calculated from Study 3 (M=7.82),
t(419) = 35.67, p b .01, d= 3.49.
As in prior research (Kraus et al., 2010), we sought to determine if
our manipulation was successful in shifting participants' momentary
perceptions of their social class rank. To that end, we examined
participants' responses on the 10-rung ladder measure of social class
rank in the low and high rank conditions. Results conﬁrmed our expec-
tations: low-rank participants, imagining an interaction with someone
at the top of the social class hierarchy, reported being lower in social
class rank (M = 4.58) than did high-rank participants who imagined
an interaction with someone at the bottom of the hierarchy (M =
5.39), t(418) = 5.00, p b .01, d= 0.49.
Analyses of class mobility estimates revealed a pattern aligningwith
the predicted positive relationship between perceived social class rank
and mobility beliefs (see Fig. 2, rightmost bars): although participants
in both conditions overestimated classmobility, participantsmanipulat-
ed to experience elevated social class rank provided higher overesti-
mates of social class mobility than their relatively lower class rank
counterparts, t(418)= 2.38, p= .02, d=0.23. Moreover, in a linear re-
gression predicting mobility overestimates with age and the manipula-
tion of subjective social class, the inﬂuence of themanipulation β= .10,
t(417) = 2.04, p b .05 on class mobility overestimates held indepen-
dently of age. Consistent with the second hypothesis and prior stud-
ies, younger participants overestimated social class mobility more
than their older counterparts β = − .18, t(417) = −3.83, p b .01.
As in Studies 1 and 3, measured subjective social class was signiﬁ-
cantly positively correlated with overestimates of class mobility
(r = .15, p b .05).
Discussion
Study 4 found a causal relationship between subjective perceptions
of social class and overestimates of class mobility: speciﬁcally,
manipulated upper-class participants tended to overestimate class mo-
bility more than their relatively lower-class counterparts. This study
aligns with the correlational ﬁndings of Studies 1 and 3 suggesting
that perceptions of elevated social class position enhance beliefs that
ascending the economic hierarchy is more likely than reality would
suggest.
General discussion
“Sowe beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into
the past.”—F. Scott Fitzgerald (1925 p. 180).
American culture is ﬁlled with anecdotes about the promise of equal
opportunity and the pursuit of happiness. Beliefs in the American
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litical agendas, and yet, according to data we present in thismanuscript,
Americans are largely inaccurate when asked to describe actual trends
in social class mobility in society. Across four studies, samples of online
survey participants and university students exhibited substantial and
consistent overestimates of class mobility—overestimating the amount
of income mobility and educational access in society by a wide margin.
A meta-analytic summary of the ﬁndings reveals that participants
overestimated class mobility by nearly 23 percentage points across the
studies (M=22.97, CI 95% [22.48, 23.47]) and by 21 points if removing
the self-relevant mobility estimates (M= 21.03, CI 95% [20.43, 21.62]).
These mobility estimates were substantially larger than general errors
in statistical estimation collected in Study 3 (M = 7.82)—mobility
overestimates appear to be larger in magnitude than general errors in
statistical probability estimation, at least in relationship to astronauts
and American soccer players.
Some Americans were more likely to overestimate social class mo-
bility than others, although these effects ranged from small to medium
inmagnitude. Youngparticipants (r's ranged from− .09 to− .19) exhib-
ited more exaggerated overestimates of social class mobility than their
older counterparts. We reason that this pattern is inﬂuenced by a lack
of exposure to class mobility information and by motivated reasoning.
Speciﬁcally, younger participants have less experience with social
class mobility andmoremotivation to believe that class mobility is pos-
sible in the future. We also found evidence suggesting that higher per-
ceived social class (r's ranged from .04 to .27) is associated with
greater overestimates of social class mobility—suggesting that people
higher in perceived social class justify their elevated positions by
suggesting that those positions are attainable by all Americans. Impor-
tantly, each experiment provided causal evidence for an informational
(Study 2) or motivational (Studies 3 and 4) account of class mobility
beliefs—that people overestimate class mobility because they lack
information about the causes of mobility, or because they seek to
protect the self.
Notwithstanding the promise of the ﬁndings from the present re-
search, several limitations merit mention. Our six item mobility beliefs
measure asked participants to make an abstract estimate of the extent
that social class mobility exists in American society. Of note, removing
any one of the speciﬁc items from the mobility beliefs measure actually
reduces the overall reliability of themeasure in each study. Additionally,
though we took steps to make the calculations for social class mobility
as simple as possible for participants—by for example, asking them to
think about 100 people rather than percentages—part of the large over-
estimation of social class mobility effect might be due to simple arith-
metic errors. While examining non-mobility beliefs in Study 3 was a
way for us to account, in part, for these errors, we acknowledge that
more research is necessary to determine the extent that general percep-
tual inaccuracy accounts for these effects (e.g., Simons & Jensen, 2009).
Importantly, we did give all participants a chance to respond to our sur-
vey by answering the question “Were any of the questions strange, un-
usual, or particularly difﬁcult?” Indeed, some participants mentioned
difﬁculty in ﬁlling out mobility estimates but mentions of this difﬁculty
represented less than 2% of the total sample and removing these partic-
ipants did not change the results reported in the paper.
Despite our efforts in the experiments to shift participant mobility
beliefs, these efforts did not elicit complete accuracy in estimates of
class mobility. It is interesting to speculate about what other psycholog-
ical variables might account for the overestimates observed in the
present studies. One candidate might be individual differences in legit-
imacy beliefs (Jetten, Haslam, & Barlow, 2013)—that is, individuals who
are particularly likely to believe in the American Dream, or in a just and
meritocratic world more broadly, might be particularly likely to overes-
timate classmobility. Future research is necessary to test this prediction.
With respect to the informational route of mobility estimates, it is
interesting to speculate about the sources of information that might
reduce overestimates of class mobility (see Cimpian & Salomon,2014): for instance, would participants update their beliefs about class
mobility when exposed to any relevant information about actual mobil-
ity or would individuals only use information consistent with their cur-
rent mobility lay theories? How might motivational and informational
routes to persuasion interact to inﬂuence changes in mobility beliefs?
It is possible that based on the present research participants would be
resistant to updating their beliefs about economic mobility if the
information conﬂicts with their existing assumptions.
Finally, that genetic explanations constrain beliefs in social classmo-
bility suggests that how Americans understand success and failure in
life and career are likely to be intimately linked to beliefs about the
types of genes an individual possesses. Do Americans have stronger ge-
netic explanations for social class than other countries or cultures? Do
these beliefs in the power of genes to dramatically shape life outcomes
hinder people from pursuing their career aspirations after encountering
initial difﬁculty (Dweck, 1990)? These questions and others like them
are likely to provide several insights into how Americans think about
the events of their lives along with the successes and failures they
encounter across the life course.
Errors in estimating the lack of social class mobility in American
society appear, based on this research, to be substantial.While this inac-
curacy in mobility estimates may enhance hard work and effort, it also
downplays the inherent strain that economic inequality places on
society, and speciﬁcally, on individuals at the bottom of the social class
hierarchy. Understanding the causes of social class mobility beliefs
along with ways to make these beliefs more accurate represents a
promising area of future research—with implications for both economic
policy change and the pursuit of happiness.
References
Adler, N.E., Epel, E.S., Castellazzo, G., & Ickovics, J.R. (2000). Relationship of subjective and
objective social status with psychological and physiological functioning: Preliminary
data in healthy white women. Health Psychology: Ofﬁcial Journal of the Division of
Health Psychology, American Psychological Association, 19(6), 586–592.
Alicke, M.D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and control-
lability of trait adjectives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1621–1630.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.49.6.1621.
Anderson, C., Brion, S., Moore, D.A., & Kennedy, J.A. (2012). A status-enhancement ac-
count of overconﬁdence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(4), 718–729.
Anderson, C., & Galinsky, A.D. (2006). Power, optimism, and risk-taking. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 36(4), 511–536. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.324.
Baker, L.A., Treloar, S.A., Reynolds, C.A., Heath, A.C., & Martin, N.G. (1996). Genetics of ed-
ucational attainment in Australian twins: Sex differences and secular changes.
Behavior Genetics, 26(2), 89–102.
Benabou, R., & Ok, E.A. (2001). Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: The
Poum hypothesis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 447–487.
Brandt, M.J. (2013). Do the disadvantaged legitimize the social system? A large-scale test
of the status-legitimacy hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
104(5), 765–785.
Brown-Iannuzzi, J.L., Lundberg, K.B., Kay, A.C., & Payne, B.K. (2015). Subjective status
shapes political preferences. Psychological Science, 26(1), 15–26.
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S.D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk a new
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science,
6(1), 3–5.
Burkhauser, R.V., Feng, S., Jenkins, S.P., & Larrimore, J. (2009). Recent trends in top income
shares in the USA: Reconciling estimates from March CPS and IRS tax return data
(working paper no. 15320). National Bureau of Economic Research (Retrieved from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15320).
Charles, K.K., & Hurst, E. (2003). The correlation of wealth across generations. Journal of
Political Economy, 111(6), 1155–1182.
Cimpian, A., & Salomon, E. (2014). The inherence heuristic: An intuitive means of making
sense of theworld, and a potential precursor to psychological essentialism. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 37(05), 461–480. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X13002197.
Davidai, S., & Gilovich, T. (2015). Building amoremobile America—One income quintile at
a time. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10, 60–71.
Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J.A., & Holzberg, A.D. (1989). Ambiguity and self-evaluation:
The role of idiosyncratic trait deﬁnitions in self-serving assessments of ability.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 1082–1090.
Durkheim, E. (1933). The division of labor in society. (1994) New York: MacMillan.
Dweck, C.S. (1990). Self-theories and goals: Their role in motivation, personality, and
development. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 38, 199–235.
Emery, L.F., & Le, B. (2014). Imagining the white picket fence social class, future plans, and
romantic relationship quality. Social Psychological and Personality Science,
1948550614524449. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550614524449.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7(2),
117–140. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001872675400700202.
111M.W. Kraus, J.J.X. Tan / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 58 (2015) 101–111Fiske, S.T., & Markus, H.R. (2012). Facing social class: How societal rank inﬂuences
interaction. Russell Sage Foundation.
Fitzgerald, F.S. (1925). The Great Gatsby. Oxford University Press.
Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M.R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem,
and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102(1), 4–27.
Hirst, W., Phelps, E.A., Buckner, R.L., Budson, A.E., Cuc, A., Gabrieli, J.D.E., et al. (2009).
Long-term memory for the terrorist attack of September 11: Flashbulb memories,
event memories, and the factors that inﬂuence their retention. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 138(2), 161–176. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
a0015527.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: H. Holt and Company.
Jellison, J.M., & Green, J. (1981). A self-presentation approach to the fundamental attribu-
tion error: The norm of internality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40(4),
643–653.
Jetten, J., Haslam, S.A., & Barlow, F.K. (2013). Bringing back the system: One reason why
conservatives are happier than Liberals is that higher socioeconomic status gives
them access to more group memberships. Social Psychological and Personality
Science, 4(1), 6–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550612439721.
Johnson, D.D., Blumstein, D.T., Fowler, J.H., & Haselton, M.G. (2013). The evolution of
error: Error management, cognitive constraints, and adaptive decision-making
biases. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 28(8), 474–481.
Jost, J.T., Banaji, M.R., & Nosek, B.A. (2004). A decade of system justiﬁcation theory: Accu-
mulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. Political
Psychology, 25, 881–919. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00402.x.
Jost, J.T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A.W., & Sulloway, F.J. (2003). Political conservatism as
motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339–375.
Keister, L.A. (2005). Getting rich: America's new rich and how they got that way. Cambridge
University Press.
Kraus, M.W., & Callaghan, B. (2014). Noblesse oblige? Social status and economic inequal-
ity maintenance among politicians. PLoS ONE, 9(1), e85293. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pone.0085293.
Kraus, M.W., Côté, S., & Keltner, D. (2010). Social class, contextualism, and empathic
accuracy. Psychological Science, 21(11), 1716–1723. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0956797610387613.
Kraus, M.W., Horberg, E.J., Goetz, J.L., & Keltner, D. (2011). Social class rank, threat vigilance,
and hostile reactivity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 0146167211410987.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167211410987.
Kraus, M.W., & Keltner, D. (2009). Signs of socioeconomic status: A thin-slicing approach.
Psychological Science, 20, 99–106.
Kraus, M.W., & Keltner, D. (2013). Social class rank, essentialism, and punitive judgment.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105(2), 247–261. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1037/a0032895.
Kraus, M.W., Piff, P.K., & Keltner, D. (2009). Social class, sense of control, and social expla-
nation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(6), 992–1004. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1037/a0016357.
Kraus, M.W., Piff, P.K., Mendoza-Denton, R., Rheinschmidt, M.L., & Keltner, D. (2012). So-
cial class, solipsism, and contextualism: How the rich are different from the poor.
Psychological Review, 119(3), 546–572. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028756.
Kraus, M.W., & Stephens, N.M. (2012). A road map for an emerging psychology of social
class. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 6(9), 642–656. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1111/j.1751-9004.2012.00453.x.
Messick, D. M., & Sentis, K. P. (1979). Fairness and preferences. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 15, 418–434.
Mishel, L., Bivens, J., Gould, E., & Shierholz, H. (2012). The state of working America (12th
ed.). New York: Cornell University Press.
Morris, M.W., & Peng, K. (1994). Culture and cause: American and Chinese attributions for
social and physical events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6),
949–971.
Napier, J. L., & Jost, J. T. (2008). Why are conservatives happier than liberals? Psychological
Science, 19, 565–572.Nisbett, R.E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social
judgment. New York: Prentice Hall.
Norton, M.I., & Ariely, D. (2011). Building a better America—One wealth quintile at a time.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1), 9–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1745691610393524.
O'Brien, L.T., & Major, B. (2005). System justifying beliefs and psychological well-being:
The roles of group status and identity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31,
1718–1729. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167205278261.
Obama (2014). State of the Union Address|The White House. (n.d.) http://www.
whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/01/29/president-obamas-2014-state-union-address
(Retrieved February 27, 2014)
Oishi, S., Kesebir, S., & Diener, E. (2011). Income inequality and happiness. Psychological
Science, 22(9), 1095–1100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797611417262.
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2001). Income inequality in the United States, 1913–1998 (series
updated to 2000 available) (working paper no. 8467). (Retrieved from http://
www.nber.org/papers/w8467) National Bureau of Economic Research.
Pronin, E., Gilovich, T., & Ross, L. (2004). Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: Divergent
perceptions of bias in self versus others. Psychological Review, 111(3), 781–799.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.111.3.781.
Rietveld, C.A., Medland, S.E., Derringer, J., Yang, J., Esko, T., Martin, N.W., et al. (2013).
GWAS of 126,559 individuals identiﬁes genetic variants associated with educational
attainment. Science (New York, N.Y.), 340(6139), 1467–1471. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1126/science.1235488.
Schwartz, B. (2011). A new veil of ignorance? Commentary on Norton and Ariely (2011).
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1), 19–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1745691610393530.
Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A.P. (2008). Self-enhancement: Food for thought. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 3(2), 102–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.
00068.x.
Segerstrom, S.C., Taylor, S.E., Kemeny, M.E., & Fahey, J.L. (1998). Optimism is associated
with mood, coping, and immune change in response to stress. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1646–1655.
Simons, D.J., & Jensen, M.S. (2009). The effects of individual differences and task difﬁculty
on inattentional blindness. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(2), 398–403. http://dx.
doi.org/10.3758/PBR.16.2.398.
Stephens, N.M., Markus, H.R., & Fryberg, S.A. (2012). Social class disparities in health and
education: Reducing inequality by applying a sociocultural self model of behavior.
Psychological Review, 119(4), 723–744. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0029028.
Tambs, K., Sundet, J.M., Magnus, P., & Berg, K. (1989). Genetic and environmental
contributions to the covariance between occupational status, educational attainment,
and IQ: A study of twins. Behavior Genetics, 19(2), 209–222.
Tan, J.J.X., & Kraus, M.W. (2015). Lay theories of social class buffer lower-class individuals
against poor self-rated health and negative affect. (in press) Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin.
Varnum, M.E. (2013). What are lay theories of social class? PLoS ONE, 8(7), e70589.
Weber, M. (1930). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. (1998) In T. Parsons
(Ed.), New York: Routledge.
Wilkinson, R.G., & Pickett, K.E. (2006). Income inequality and population health: A review
and explanation of the evidence. Social Science & Medicine, 62(7), 1768–1784. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2005.08.036.
Williams, M.J., & Eberhardt, J.L. (2008). Biological conceptions of race and the motivation
to cross racial boundaries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(6),
1033–1047. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.94.6.1033.
Wilson, T.D., & Gilbert, D.T. (2005). Affective forecasting knowing what to want. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 14(3), 131–134. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-
7214.2005.00355.x.
